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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw -

FULL FAITH AND
DIVORCES

CREDIT -

FOREIGN

H and W were domiciled in New Jersey. H was guilty of marital
offenses. W, for the purpose of securing a divorce, set up residence
in Reno, Nevada, for the six weeks period necessary to the bringing of a divorce action in that state. She then filed suit alleging
her domicile in Nevada, and so testified in court. H appeared and
filed a counterclaim but did not contest the jurisdiction of the
court. The court awarded an absolute divorce to H on his counterclaim after having found that it had jurisdiction. Both H and W
returned immediately to New Jersey. Later, W brought an action
in New Jersey for maintainence and sought to set aside the Nevada
divorce decree as having been procured by the perpetration of a
fraud on the Nevada court. Held: Where a divorce decree issues
from an adversary proceeding in which both parties are represented by independent counsel and have full opportunity to contest
all the issues therein, it must be given full faith and credit in the
courts of a sister state. Nappe v. Nappe, __N. J. _, 120 A.2d

31 (1956).
An action for divorce is today characterized as an action quasi
in rem. Williams v. North Carolina,317 U.S. 226 (1942). There-

fore, full faith and credit must be given to the divorce decree
rendered in another state, even though in an ex parte hearing, if
jurisdiction based on the domicile of one of the parties exists
and service of process on the absent party is in conformity with
procedural due process. Williams v. North Carolina,supra. A common method of service on defendants outside the jurisdiction, that
of an order of publication and substituted service, has been held
to comply with procedural due process. Williams v. North Carolina, supra. However, the defendant of an ex parte hearing is not
precluded from collaterally attacking on jurisdictional grounds
the judgment rendered in that hearing, when that judgment is
sought to be enforced in the sister state. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 266 (1945). There is a strong presumption that
the decree is valid, and the burden is upon the party attacking the
decree. Esenwein v. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1945).
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Even if jurisdiction does not exist, if the defendant enters a
general appearance in the trial, full faith and credit must be given
to a divorce decree rendered in such a proceeding. Sherrer v.
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1947). This is also true where the defendant makes a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 275 App. Div. 642, 92 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1949).
The finding of jurisdiction by the court becomes res judicata and
binds all other courts, whether the defendant has contested or
admitted the court's jurisdiction. Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra; Coe
v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1947). The defendant may enter a valid appearance through counsel. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581
(1951). However, the defendant or his authorized attorney must
make an actual appearance, for it has been held that a signed
entry of appearance presented to the court by one spouse for the
other does not preclude the absent spouse from making a later
collateral attack on jurisdictional grounds. Eaton v. Eaton, 227
La. 992, 81 So.2d 371 (1955). A third person not a party to the
divorce action is also barred from collaterally attacking a divorce
decree in which both parties thereto were present and each had full
opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues, when such collateral attack is not allowed in the state rendering the decree. Johnson v. Muelberger, supra; Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
Generally, if a pre-existing right of such third person is prejudiced
by the divorce, then the third person may make a collateral attack
on the decree. Tallentine v. Burkhart, 153 Fla. 278, 14 So.2d
395 (1943).
In a New Jersey case decided subsequent to the decisions in the
Sherrer and Coe cases, a proviso was created to the rule enunciated
in those cases. It was held that a wife was not barred from collaterally attacking a Florida divorce awarded to her husband although she had made an appearance, when she adduced evidence
to show that her husband had organized a conspiracy to defraud
the Florida court, and that she had been induced to support him
in his actions by an agreement between them conditioned upon her
support, thus negating the concept of an adversary proceeding.
Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951). It was held
that the rule of the Sherrer and Coe cases applied only to cases of
true adversary proceedings where both parties had the complete
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opportunity to contest any of the issues involved. Vanderbilt, C. J.,
in his dissent in the present case, points up several facts which
would tend to show ".... that the husband dominated the entire
situation from beginning to end. .. ." Principally, these facts re-

late to (1) an agreement between the spouses regarding the divorce while both were still in New Jersey, (2) the unusual conduct of the wife's Nevada attorney at the trial, and (3) the husband's paying the wife's attorney fee. Despite these facts, the
majority is able to find an adversary proceeding which bars the
wife's later attack. It seems evident that the majority is attempting
to stem any extension of the doctrine of the Staedler case and is
perhaps confining that rule to its facts.
There is certainly no unity in the current views taken of the
modem trend on this topic by the text writers. Many are appalled
that a dissolution of the marriage bonds may today be accomplished in effect by the consent of the spouses. Reference is commonly made to the "quickie divorce" states, and it is pointed out
that Supreme Court decisions have virtually repealed the conservative laws of many states on the subject. Advocates of the
modern trend point out that today the relationship between the
parties is more firmly established and more uniform among several jurisdictions. The likelihood of a later child's legitimacy being impeached today is much less than before. Regardless of the
controversial nature of this trend, it seems to be relatively well
established, and later cases will probably only add refinements to
the present rules.
David M. Woolley

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

PRE-EMPTION BY FEDERAL LAW -

ANTI-

SEDITION LEGISLATION

Defendant, an acknowledged member of the Communist Party,
was convicted for violating the Pennsylvania Sedition Act which
punishes the advocacy of the overthrow of the national government
by force and violence. The conviction was based solely upon acts
of sedition directed toward the federal government. Since the
Smith Act, as amended by Congress in 1948, embodies substantially the same prohibitions as the Pennsylvania Act, the Supreme
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Court of that state held that the Smith Act had superseded the
state act. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held: The scheme of federal regulation in the field of anti-sedition legislation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Steve Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1955).

In the past, various states have enacted criminal anarchy statutes
and statutes prohibiting membership in organizations dedicated to
the overthrow of the national government; such statutes have been
held not to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 252 (1925); Whitney v.

California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Although such enactments are
an unquestioned exercise of police power by the states, when Congress enacts legislation covering the same area the questions of the
instant case arise: May Congress constitutionally exercise exclusive control over threats to national security and, if it may, did
it intend to do so?

It was early recognized, with regard to the commerce power of
the federal government, that Congress should have the exclusive
right to legislate in those subjects which are national in scope and
require uniform regulation; in those fields that are local in scope,
the states may legislate until such a time as Congress should
choose to occupy the field. Cooley v. Port Wardens, 19 U.S.

(12 How.) 143 (1851). More recently, in the field of alien registration, the Supreme Court has indicated that where the federal
government has enacted a complete scheme of regulation, states
may not enact laws which either conflict with or complement the
national legislation. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1940).

On other occasions the Court has seen fit to allow state action even
in the face of comprehensive congressional legislation. The dissent in the instant case relys heavily upon U. S. v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377 (1922), in which a violation of the Eighteenth Amendment
was considered to be an offense against the sovereignty of both
the state and national government. A pacificst movement obstructing enlistments during World War I was also considered such
a dual offense, though the acts were aimed solely at the federal
government and Congress had enacted legislation covering such
acts. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 327 (1920).
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Neither the Smith Act nor its legislative history expressly indicates whether Congress intended to exercise its federal powers to
the exclusion of the states. Congress, recognizing the nature and
purpose of the Communist Party and its relation to the international "cold war," has formulated a complete legislative system
to cope with the problem. Provision is made to combat communist
front and communist action organizations as well as the individual.
Registration of all communists is required and sanctions are imposed against communist-infiltrated organizations. Observing the
completeness of the national legislation and the dominant interest
of the national government, it would seem inescapable that Congress intended to occupy the field to the exclusion of the state
governments. Further, if the states are allowed to legislate concurrently against the same act of sedition toward the national government, only conflicting and incompatible adjudications can result
from the different penalties and criteria of substantive offenses.
In the instant case the Pennsylvania Sedition Act bore greater
penalties than did the federal statute, yet the state prosecution
could be begun on a mere information by a private citizen rather
than indictment by a grand jury as required by the Smith Act.
In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, it would seem
reasonable that Congress did not wish to impose the form of dual
punishment which results from concurrent state legislation.
It is submitted that the principal case is well reasoned upon
the principles established in such cases as Cooley v. Port Wardens
and Hines v. Davidowitz. It should be remembered that the case
is not without its limitations. The instant decision does not prevent the states from protecting themselves from acts of violence
and sabotage, nor does it preclude state action when the same act
constitutes a crime against both the state and the national government. And, of course, Congress may expressly give concurrent
powers of legislation and enforcement to the states as it did under
the Eighteenth Amendment.
Don M. Dean
INSURANCE -

CONTRACTS

-

CONSTRUCTION

P's deceased husband, the insured, applied for a life insurance
policy from D through D's soliciting agent. After the policy was
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rejected by the insured because it contained two aviation exclusion riders, D's officer, with knowledge that insured was on flying
status as an Air Force gunner and that insured objected to any
aviation restrictions, removed one of the riders but allowed the
other to remain in the policy. D's agent returned the policy to the
insured and told him that the aviation rider had been removed
and that his flying status was now covered by the policy. The
insured accepted the policy without reading it, relying on the
agent's statements. The insured was later killed while on a training flight and D refused to pay because the risk was excluded
under the rider remaining in the policy. Held: Where insured
rejects a policy containing two aviation risk riders and an officer
of an insurance company, with knowledge of insured's occupation, removes only one rider and returns the policy to the insured
for acceptance, the policy is of doubtful meaning and will be
construed strictly against the insurer. Trahan v. Southland Life
Ins. Co., - Tex. -, 289 S.W.2d 753 (1956).
The general rule of construction of contracts is that the contract will be construed strictly against the party whose words
it is and liberally in favor of the other party. McClenathan v.
Davis, 243 Ill. 87, 90 N.E. 265 (1909). This rule is based on
the theory that the party who uses the words has his choice of
words and should be able to make his intention clear. However,
this rule of construction is never to be invoked unless there is
ambiguity present in the contract itself. Griffin v. Fairmont Coal
Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S.E. 24 (1905); Reynolds v. McMan Oil
& Gas Co., 11 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); Wood
Motor Co. v. Nebel, 150 Tex. 86, 238 S.W.2d 181 (1951). If the
contract itself is unambiguous, then extrinsic evidence cannot be
admitted to create an ambiguity. Kahn v. Kahn, 94 Tex. 114,
58 S.W. 825 (1900); Lewis v. East Texas Finance, 136 Tex. 149,
146 S.W.2d 977 (1941). The theory underlying this rule is that
the parties, in reducing the contract to writing, are attempting
to make certain that which is uncertain and this attempt would
be futile if extrinsic evidence were permitted to vary, contradict,
or make the contract ambiguous. San Antonio Machine and Supply v. Allan, 284 S.W. 542 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926); Ross &
Sensibaugh v. McLelland, 262 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.
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1953) ref. n.r.e. There is some authority that extrinsic evidence
can be considered even when there is no ambiguity in the contract
itself. Ryan v. Kent, 36 S.W.2d 1007 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931).
This appears to have been limited by later authorities. Lone Star
Gas Co. v. X Ray Gas Co., 139 Tex. 546, 164 S.W.2d 503 (1942).
Insurance contracts are subject to the same general rules of
law, and the limitations to these rules, which are applied to
other contracts. Brown v. PalatineIns. Co., 89 Tex. 590, 35 S.W.
1060 (1896). The rule of construction of insurance contracts is
that they should be construed strictly against the insurer and
liberally in favor of the insured. Lloyds Cas. Insurer v. McCrary,
149 Tex. 172, 229 S.W.2d 605 (1950); Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Proffitt, 150 Tex. 207, 239 S.W.2d 379 (1951).
It has been said that this is an exception to the general contract
rule, but when it is realized that in almost all cases the insurer
has written the policy with the help of competent legal advice
and the insured has had little, if any, choice in the wording of
the contract, it is readily seen that the general rule is being
applied. Burns v. American Nat'l. Ins. Co., 280 S.W. 762 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1926). The insurance rule of construction is also
subject to the limitation that it is not to be applied unless there
is an ambiguity in the policy itself which calls for construction.
General American Life Ins. Co. v. Rios, 139 Tex. 554, 164 S.W.
2d 521 (1942). Likewise, the court cannot create an ambiguity
just to give room for construction in order that a harsh result
might be avoided. Bridge v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 302 Ill.
App. 1, 23 N.E.2d 367 (1939). The policy must be enforced as
made by the parties if it is unambiguous in itself. East Texas
Fire Ins. Co. v. Kempner, 87 Tex. 229, 27 S.W. 122 (1894);
Home Ins. Co. v. Rose, 152 Tex. 222, 255 S.W.2d 861 (1953).
In the principal case it was recognized that the policy with
only one rider attached was unambiguous in itself; however, the
court allowed evidence of the fact that there were two different
aviation exclusion riders attached to the policy before it was
accepted to raise an ambiguity in an otherwise unambiguous
policy. The court has applied the rule of construction that the
insurance policy will be construed strictly against the insurer and
liberally in favor of the insured to a fact situation where there
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is nothing itself calling for construction. Possibly the court has
reached a just result, but in so doing it is submitted that a dangerous precedent has been created for the proposition that, under
analagous facts, extrinsic evidence will be admitted to bear on
the contract and create an ambiguity where none existed before.
Geo. R. Alexander, Jr.
INSURANCE -

DOUBLE INDEMNITY -

RELEASE

A life insurance policy provided for payment of $1,000 to the
beneficiary upon the death of the insured, and an additional
$1,000 in the event of accidental death. When the insured died,
the insurer paid the beneficiary $1,000, and she executed a
release of claim for the additional $1,000. Upon discovering that
the insured's death may have been accidental, she sued to recover
the double indemnity benefits, and the jury found that the death
was accidental. The insurer defended upon its release. Held: A
double indemnity policy creates two separate and independent
demands and, therefore, payment of $1,000 by the insurer to
the beneficiary on the death of the insured is not consideration
for the beneficiary's release of claim for the additional $1,000.
Hallmark v. United Fidelity Life Ins. Co., - Tex. -, 286 S.W.2d
133 (1956).
It is well settled that the mere payment of a lesser sum is not
satisfaction for the whole of a liquidated or undisputed claim,
and such payment is not consideration for the release of the
balance which is due and owing. National Mut. Benefit Ass'n. v.
Butler, 72 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error dism.,
approved in People's Mut. Life Ass'n. v. Martindale, 80 S.W.2d
484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). Where the beneficiary has only one
claim, part of which is disputed and part of which is undisputed,
there is a conflict in Texas as to whether payment of the conceded
part is sufficient consideration for the discharge of the disputed
balance. One line of cases suggests that payment by a debtor of
what he admits to be due is no consideration for any promise of
the creditor. Woodall v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 79 S.W. 1090
(Tex. Civ. App. 1904); Chicago Fraternal Life Ins. Ass'n. v.
Herring, 104 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). Other cases
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have held that a dispute as to a part of the debt makes the whole
debt a disputed one, so as to come within the general rule that the
payment of a sum less than that claimed as due in full discharge
of an unliquidated or disputed claim is a good accord and satisfaction, and is consideration for a release of the balance due and
owing. Fennell v. Troell, 226 S.W. 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920);
Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Heavin, 39 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Johnston, 123 Tex. 592,
72 S.W.2d 583 (1934). The Court of Appeals in the principal
case supported the latter cases, after deciding that a double indemnity policy gives the beneficiary a single, partly disputed
claim. United Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Hallmark, 278 S.W.2d 173
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
Where a creditor holds two distinct and independent claims,
payment by the debtor of one of the claims is not consideration
for the release of the other distinct and independent claim.
Fidelity and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mountcastle, 200 S.W. 862 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1918); Machicek v. Renger, 185 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1945) error ref.
In order for the Court to determine the proper rule of consideration in the principal case, it was necessary to decide whether
the beneficiary had one or two separate claims. In avoiding the
conflict of opinion which the Court of Appeals had attempted
to settle, the Court relied heavily upon the leading double indemnity cases of Woodmen of the World Ins. Soc'y. v. Smauley,
153 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); approved in Woodmen
of the World Ins. Soc'y. v. Brown, 164 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942), holding that a double indemnity policy affords the
beneficiary two separate claims. The principal case and the
Smauley case are almost identical in their fact situations, but in
the Smauley case the Court did not directly state that the beneficiary had two separate and independent claims under the double
indemnity policy, distinguishing the holding there from the
Heavin and Johnston cases, supra, although it seems apparent
that the Court did not consider a double indemnity claim to be
a disputed part of a single claim.
The Supreme Court in the principal case did distinguish the
Heavin and Johnston cases, however, by reasoning that they in-
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volved alternative claims and not independent claims. The Heavin
case, for example, involved a dispute over whether the insured
died by suicide or by other means. If the death was by suicide,
the beneficiary was entitled to collect only the amount of the
premiums paid under the policy. If the death was by other means,
the beneficiary was entitled to the full proceeds under the policy.
Since in no event can the beneficiary collect both demands, the
claim was a single one. In the double indemnity cases, however,
as the Court pointed out, there is a possibility that the beneficiary
can collect both demands, and thus the claims are not alternative
but separate and independent. There are decisions in other jurisdictions which sustain this argument and apply, consequently, the
same rule of consideration. See Buel v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,
32 N.M. 34, 250 Pac. 635 (1926); Amer. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Reed,
26 Ala. App. 350, 160 So. 543 (1934); Matthews v. Gulf Life
Ins. Co., 64 Ga. App. 112, 12 S.E.2d 202 (1941). Contra:Painter
v. Nat. Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 158 Kan. 715, 150 P.2d 171
(1944).
It is submitted that the reasoning of the Court on both the insurance and the consideration points is sound. The insurance company, by the terms of its contract, had promised to pay a certain
amount upon the death of the insured, and to pay an additional
amount in the event of an accidental death. As a result there were
two separate and independent claims which the benficiary could
pursue, and under well settled rules of consideration, payment
of one could not be consideration for the release of the other.
Ivan Irwin, Jr.

LIENS-STATUTORY

ATTORNEYS'

LIENS-DISCHARGE BY CLIENT

P recovered a judgment against D. P's discharged attorney,
who did not participate in the trial of the case, intervened in the
action and sought to recover part of the D's impounded judgment
settlement from P for his contingent fee, under the Illinois Attorney's Lien Act. Held: An attorney may recover against a successful plaintiff the entire amount contracted for on a contingent fee
basis when such attorney is discharged without cause before the
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case is tried. Peresipka v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 231
F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1956).
At common law an attorney had no lien on a cause of action
before final judgment. Sandburg v. Victor Gold and Silver Mining
Co., 18 Utah 66, 55 Pac. 74 (1898). Attorney's statutory liens
today create a property right in the attorney either in accordance
with the common law rule, 2 BuRNs' AN~o. IND. STATS. Sec. 43619, or from the time statutory notice is served. 13 ILL. REV.
STAT. Ch. 13, Sec. 14; 5 R. C. WASH. 60.40.10. These statutory
liens were created to protect attorneys from a client's discharge
in bad faith or settlement out of court without the attorney's
consent. Northrup v. Hayward, 102 Minn. 307, 113 N.W. 701
(1907); 34 NEB. L. REV. 703. If the attorney consents to settlement then the lien does not attach. Gardner v. Atchison, Topeka
and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 226 F.2d 109 (7th Cir. 1955). Most such
statutes have been upheld as constitutional, Catherwood v. Morris,
360 Ill. 473, 196 N.E. 519 (1935); O'Connor v. St. Louis Transit
Co., 198 Mo. 622, 97 S.W. 150 (1906); but in one instance such
a statute has been held invalid. Laplacca v. Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Co., 265 Pa. 304, 108 Atl. 612 (1919). These liens are,
in effect, assignments of an interest in any judgment rendered
or in the proceeds of any settlement made by the client. Baker
v. Baker, 258 Ill. 418, 101 N.E. 587 (1913). The attorney is
considered a "joint claimant" with the client. McArdle v. Great
American Indemnity Co., 314 Ill. App. 455, 41 N.E.2d 964
(1942).
Although, in the case at bar, the court found the discharge to
be without cause, the relationship of reliance, trust, and confidence
was destroyed and hence the plaintiff was entitled to dismiss the
attorney. Nevertheless a majority of courts hold that the lien is
valid, and the attorney is entitled to recover. White v. American
Law Book Co., 106 Okla. 166, 233 Pac. 426 (1924). The attorney's lien attaches to the judgment when he is discharged, Goldberg v. Perlmutter, 308 Ill. App. 84, 31 N.E.2d 333 (1941);
Cohen v. Kirchheimer, 285 Ill. App. 583, 2 N.E.2d 592 (1936);
and the recovery is held to be the contract amount. McGlynn &
McGlynn v. Louisville and N.R. Co., 313 Ill. App. 396, 40
N.E.2d 539 (1942). The requirement of statutory notice to the

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

defendent must be met in order for such lien to be valid. Emerson
v. Underwood, 184 Okla. 358, 87 P.2d 977 (1939); Orr v.

Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Assn., 240 Mo. App. 236,
207 S.W.2d 511 (1947).
Some cases, however, uphold the lien on the theory that the
efforts of the attorney produce the judgment, indicating that
participation of the attorney in the trial is necessary. Young v.
Levine, 326 Mo. 593, 31 S.W.2d 978 (1930). There has been
dicta to the effect that the lien on the proceeds of litigation should
be declared in favor of an attorney in a cause where "equitable"
considerations require that the lien be recognized. Debit v. Howard, 107 Colo. 51, 108 P.2d 1053 (1941). This reasoning seems
to favor quantum meruit as the proper measure of recovery. A
well-reasoned case on this point asserts that because of the unique
relationship, the client may terminate the contract at any time
without cause, and no damages are assessed because of the discharge before trial. Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46
(1916); and see Thompson v. Smith, 248 S. W. 1070 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1923). The majority favors the recovery of the
contract amount on the theory that the advice given before trial
is the most valuable service rendered. Kikuchi v. Ritchie, 202 Fed.
857 (9th Cir. 1913).
The principal case follows the majority view that an attorney
discharged without cause before the trial of the case is entitled
to recover his full fee as if he had actually procured the judgment. Although there is merit in the minority view that the attorney
should be compensated only for the amount of pre-trial work
done, it is submitted that, because of the contractual relationship,
the rule of the principal case produces the more satisfactory
result. If this rule were not applied, the attorney would be inequitably burdened with proof of consequential damages and
proof of an attempt to mitigate damages, a burden which could
often allow the client to profit from his wrongful act.

Mac McCrea
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -

TORT LIABILITY -

NUISANCE

A small child drowned in a deep excavation used as a city
dump. The excavation was filled with water, and debris had
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formed across the top, giving it the appearance of solid ground,
while in fact it consisted only of a thin layer of trash covering
deep stagnant water, incapable of supporting any weight. Held:
A municipal corporation is liable in damages for maintaining a
nuisance, it being no defense that the operation of a dump is an
exercise of a governmental function. Lehmkuhl v. Junction City,
Kan. -, 294 P.2d 621 (1956).
It is generally stated that municipal liability in tort depends
upon the nature of the function involved. If the function is
"corporate," there is liability; but if the function is "governmental," there is immunity. Dilley v. Houston, 148 Tex. 191, 222
S.W.2d 992 (1949); City of Hazard v. Duff, 287 Ky. 426, 154
S.W.2d 28 (1941). This catagorical classification of municipal
acts as a basis for determining liability dates back to the eighteenth century, Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667, 100
Eng. Rep. 259 (1789), and constantly changing views concerning
proper governmental responsibility have demonstrated the inability of such a rule to do justice in all cases,. Note, Extension
of Municipal Tort Liability, 1 BROOKLYN L. REV. 85 (1932);
Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1376 (1939).
Although the courts have tenaciously held to the majority rule
in principle, in keeping with the modern tendency toward eliminating municipal immunity, many decisions have reduced the
immunity so long enjoyed by municipalities by straining to hold
as a corporate function what might be expected to be governmental. McLeod v. Duluth, 174 Minn. 181, 218 N.W. 892 (1928);
Annot., 156 A.L.R. 693 (1945); Cf. Autry v. Augusta, 33 Ga.
App. 757, 127 S.E. 796 (1925). There is no uniform holding
among the states as to what is a corporate and what is a governmental function. Note, Inroads Upon Municipal Immunity in
Tort, 46 HARV. L. REV. 305 (1932-33). Other courts have developed exceptions to the general rule. These exceptions include
active wrongdoing chargeable to the corporation, Fartillo v.
Newark, 133 N.J.L. 19, 42 A.2d 260 (1945), dangerous conditions of a street, Wichita Falls v. Crummer, 71 S.W.2d 583 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934) error dism., and nuisance, Barker v. Santa Fe,
47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480 (1943).
In the principal case, the city was held liable because it main-
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tained a governmental function which constituted a nuisance.
Between non-liability for negligence and liability for nuisance
there is considerable confusion. Some courts have held a city
liable for its negligent trespass to land and yet, not liable for trespasses to persons. Robertson v. Wyoming Township, 312 Mich.
14, 19 N.W.2d 469 (1945); Connally v. Waco, 53 S.W.2d 313,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref. These unexplainable distinctions are merely examples of the method by which the courts are
retreating from the doctrine of municipal non-liability.
A similar conflict exists in Texas. The majority doctrine of
non-liability for negligence is firmly established, Scroggings v.
Harlingen, 131 Tex. 236, 112 S.W.2d 1035, a/I'd. 114 S.W. 2d
853 (1938); Dallas v. Smith, 130 Tex. 225, 107 S.W.2d 872
(1937), with an equally strong exception in cases of nuisance.
Parson v. Texas City, 259 S.W.2d 333, (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)
error ref.; Bates v. Houston, 189 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945) ref. w.o.m.; Fort Worth v. Crawford, 74 Tex. 404, 12 S.W.
52 (1889).
In view of the inroads made upon municipal immunity, and
the occasional holdings that a city is liable for negligence, Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1923), Fowler v.
Cleveland, 100 Ohio 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919), should there be
a distinction in liability for a corporate act as compared to one
that is governmental? Mr. Justice Cardozo felt that there was
neither reason nor justice in the distinction. CARDOZO, LAW AND
LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS, p. 57 (1930). A city is liable in
contract whether governmental or proprietary. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Asheville, N. C., 85 F.2d 966 (4th Cir.
1936); McCollum v. Richardson, 121 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938). Admiralty proceedings also make no distinction
between governmental and corporate functions. Workmen v. New
York, Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty, 179 U.S. 552 (1900).
In Civil Law jurisdictions there is no question of municipal liability where a city was negligent or has maintained a nuisance,
and though liability may be limited, there is no absolute denial
of liability by reason of sovereign immunity. 2 GOODMAN, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 161.
It is submitted that there is no logical reasoning behind these

RECENT CASE NOTES

differences. But until the various state legislatures take steps to
remedy the confusion, the courts will continue to follow the exceptions that have developed, rather than judicially eliminating the
distinction between nuisance and negligence as applied to municipal corporations.
Robert A. Watson

OIL AND GAS -

MINES AND MINERALS -

OPEN MINE DOCTRINE

APPLICABLE TO MERE LEASE

Husband and wife executed an oil and gas lease upon their
homestead. No oil wells had been drilled when the husband died.
Thereafter, lessee acting under the lease drilled producing wells.
Held: The widow, whose homestead estate until the homestead is
abandoned is equivalent in nature to a life estate, is entitled under
the open mine doctrine to the use and enjoyment of the royalty and
not merely the interest thereon. Youngman v. Shular, - Tex. -,
288 S.W.2d 495 (1956) (6-3 decision).
The open mine doctrine authorizes a life tenant to continue
to work or have operated, even to exhaustion, a mine or well
opened at the time the life estate commenced, or to receive the
proceeds (royalties) of such operation. 3 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS
548, §613 (2d ed. 1938). The doctrine, which had long been well
established at common law, may be considered an exception to
the rule that a life tenant is liable to the remainderman for permanent injury to the inheritance, inasmuch as it is not waste to work
an open mine. Co. LITT., p. 54(p). "If the pits or mines were
open before, it is no waste for the tenant to continue digging them
for his own use; for it is now become the mere annual profit of
the land." 2 BL. COMM. 282. See 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROP. 635,
§633 (3rd ed. 1939).
Although a life tenant may continue to work an open mine,
where there is no open mine he has no right, as against the remainderman, to open mines and commit waste after the commencement of the life estate unless, in the case of a conventional life
estate, that right was granted to him by the previous owner (the
unopened mine rule). Davis v. Bond, 138 Tex. 206, 158 S.W.2d
297 (1942); Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co., 98 Tex. 597, 86 S.W.
740, 742 (1905); 3 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS 547, 551-52, §613
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(2d ed. 1938). A mineral lease executed by the prior landowner
authorizing the opening of mines is itself in effect an open mine,
though no mine is actually open and there is no production until
after commencement of the life estate. Priddy v. Griffith, 150 Ill.
560, 37 N.E. 999 (1894); Koen v. Bartlett, 41 W. Va. 559, 23
S.E. 664 (1895); Warren v. Martin, 168 Ark. 682, 272 S.W. 367
(1925). Whether there is an actually open mine or a mere lease,
production ensues from the act or authorization of the previous
landowner. Lawley v. Richardson, 101 Okl. 40, 223 Pac. 156
(1924). This rule, which is controlling in the principal case, is
announced with authorities cited in 3 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS
548.49, §613 (2d ed. 1938); 2 THORNTON, OIL AND GAS 722,
§416 (5th ed. 1932); SULLIVAN, OIL AND GAS LAW 128, §63
(1955). See also, anticipating the holding in the principal case,
Guittard, Rights of a Life Tenant, 4 TEXAS BAR JOURNAL 265
(June, 1941); Barton v. Warner, 142 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940) (dictum); 30 TEXAS L. REV. 134, 136 (1951).
The dissenting opinion, emphasizing the homestead character
of the particular estate, states that the intention of the previous
owner is of no consequence where the life or homestead estate is
created by operation of law (by statute in this case). But this feature is present whether the situation is an actually open mine or
a mere lease. The dissent also stresses the nature of the homestead as a statutory provision for security of shelter rather than
for income. But for the purposes of the open mine doctrine no
distinction is made in other jurisdictions between a conventional
life estate and a life estate by operation of law, and it is established in this State that, until abandoned, a homestead estate is
the equivalent of a life estate, and the open mine doctrine is
equally applicable. Thompson v. Thompson, 149 Tex. 632, 236
S.W.2d 779, 786-88 (1951); White v. Blackman, 168 S.W.2d
531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. w.o.m.; Petrus v. Cage
Bros., 128 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Civ* App. 1939) error ref. In this
case of first impression in this State, the dissent contends that the
authorities in other jurisdictions should not be followed and that,
in any event, the legislature should act to achieve a fair relationship between life tenant and remainderman and to redefine the
interest of the homestead occupant.
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What are the ramifications of Youngman v. Shular? Some problems suggested by the dissent are significant. First, if the lease
expires without production prior to the death of the husband, does
the open mine doctrine apply so as to entitle the widow to mine
or to lease and receive all the royalties? Is there any difference
between such an expired lease and a mine that is open but no
longer worked? If at the time of the husband's death there is no
open mine and no lease, a lease having expired without production
prior to the husband's death, it is submitted that the open mine
doctrine should not apply. The issue may turn on whether the
expired lease is to be considered the same in legal effect as a
mine open but no longer worked, in which case the doctrine would
apply, or as a mine that has been abandoned as such with an intention permanently to refrain from mining, in which case the doctrine is not applicable. See Bagot v. Bagot, 32 Beav. 509, 55 Eng.
Rep. 200, 203 (Ch. 1863); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROP. 636, §633
(3rd ed. 1939); 2 THORNTON, OIL AND GAS 722, §416 (5th ed.
1932). A lease having expired without production during the
previous landowner's lifetime, there remains nothing from which
to infer an intention further to exploit the land for minerals.
Thus the expiration of the lease during the husband's lifetime
seems more analogous to an abandoned mine than to an open mine
that is merely no longer being worked. Further, this analogy to
abandonment seems unnecessary to attain the same result. The
very fact that nothing remains from which to infer an intention
to mine or to have mined is sufficient to make the open mine
doctrine inapplicable.
Second, where the lease expires without production after the
husband's death, what is the effect upon the open mine doctrine?
That the life tenant is confined to royalties from the particular
lease in existence at the time of commencement of the life estate
with no actually open mines has been indicated. Barton v. Warner,
142 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Re Shailer's Estate,
Okl. -, 266 P.2d 613 (1954); Lawley v. Richardson, supra.
See also SULLIVAN, OIL AND GAS LAW 128, §63 ("royalty from
wells which are drilled under the existing lease"). Where mines
are actually open when the life estate commences, the law conclusively infers that the previous owner intended the existing use

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

to continue (in the absence of a contrary manifestation, if the life
estate is created by act of the parties). In the case of a mere lease,
what is the extent of this conclusive inference? Logically it can
be argued that the intention is referable only to the particular
lease in existence, or that it is not so limited; hence, a decision
in such a case should be based on what is the better policy, considering the more extreme consequences when the doctrine is
applied to a mere lease and in favor of an estate created by law,
as pointed out by the dissent.
John Bailey
PROCEDURE -

JURISDICTION -

MODIFICATION OF

SUPPORT DECREES

In a proceeding in District Court A of Harris County, realtor
was awarded a divorce from his wife and ordered to pay towards
the support of his children, the custody of whom was given to
his wife. Later the wife brought suit in District Court B of Harris
County to have the support decree modified. Held: District courts
of counties coming under Rule 330, TEX. RULES CIV. PRO. (1941),
have no jurisdiction to modify support decrees originally granted
from another district court of the same county absent a valid
transfer order. Ex parte Goldsmith, - Tex. -, 290 S.W. 2d 502
(1956).
All district courts of the county of a plaintiff's domicile have
jurisdiction over divorce and support suits. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
(1925), art. 4631. By the interpretations of Art. 4639a, TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. (1925), the jurisdiction of the court granting
the original support decree has been held to be continuing and
exclusive. Williams v. Williams, 183 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944); Yeagle v. Bull, 235 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950);
Ex parte Webb, 153 Tex. 234, 266 S.W.2d 855 (1954). The court
rendering the support decree would be, therefore, the only court
having the power to modify such decree. If a court is without the
power to acquire jurisdiction, its acts and proceedings are void.
Cline v. Niblo, 117 Tex. 474, 2 S.W.2d 633 (1928); Ex parte
Armstrong, 110 Tex. Cr. R. 362, 8 S.W.2d 674 (1928); Smith v.
Little, 217 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e.
In the principal case, two different analyses of the problem of
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whether Court B should act were presented. The majority of the
court treated the problem as one of jurisdicition, while the minority treated the problem as one of procedure. In applying Art.
4639a to the facts of the case, the majority treated each court as
being separate and distinct, regardless of the fact that the courts
acted under Rule 330e which provides for transfers of cases
between the district courts of the same county and for the informal
transfer of cases by allowing idle judges to sit as judges of other
courts. Thus the attempted modification of the support decree had
been in a court other than the one issuing the original decree, and
its proceedings were void. Since the proceedings and judgment
were void, no question of procedure could arise.
The theory of the dissent was that in counties whose courts
operate under Rule 330 there is actually one large district court
with several judges. Therefore since Court A and Court B are
the same court, the provision of Art. 4 6 3 9 a which says the support
decree can be modified only by the court that originally issued
the decree is not violated. It is submitted that the fallacy of the
dissent's reasoning lies in its basic premise, viz., that where the
courts of a county are operating under Rule 330 there is only
one court with several judges. While Rule 330e provides a flexible
system for the exchange of cases between the district courts of
the same county when the county comes within its provisions, there
is no indication that it was intended to make a change as drastic
as that of completely unifying the district courts within one
county. Moreover, it would seem impossible that Rules of Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court could combine judicial district which have been created as separate entities by the
legislature.
The only other ground on which the dissent might be justified
is by reasoning that Rule 330e provides for the exchange of cases
between district courts of the same county, and that Rule 1 provides that the Rules are to be construed liberally to obtain a just
and expeditious adjudication of the substantive rights of the
parties. The argument is applicable to this case since the point
of substantive law was decided against the realtor. If Court B
had had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, tfTen
there would have been a procedural problem concerning the lack
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of strict compliance with the transfer provisions of Rule 330e.
However, since the proceedings and judgment were complete
nullities due to Court B's lack of jurisdiction, there was no judgment to be given validity by a liberal construction of the Rules.
There are two cases from Courts of Civil Appeals that tend
to support the view of the dissenting opinion. In Boyles v. Gohen,
230 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e., and Ross
v. Drouilhet, 80 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) writ ref., it was
argued that an attack on a certain judgment was collateral rather
than direct, since it was not brought in the same district court
of the county. This argument was rejected since the suit attacking
the judgment was in the second district court by virtue of the
method of assigning cases contained in Art. 199, district 11, TEX.
REV. CiV. STAT. (1925), providing that cases be assigned to the
courts in rotation. If the suit for modification of the support
decree in the principal case came to be in District Court B in this
manner, then the Boyles and Ross cases and the principal case
are in direct conflict. It is not clear from the facts presented in
the principal case by what means the case was put on the docket
of Court B, except that it was not by a valid transfer order, so
the cases may well be distinguishable. It seems likely that if it
had been put on Court B's docket by the regular method of assigning cases provided in Art. 199, the jurisdiction of Court B would
have been upheld.
Under the present law the majority opinion seems sound.
Policywise, the result of the dissent seems preferable since the
goal of the judicial process is the determination of the substantive
rights of the litigants, and therefore cases should not be reversed
on procedural technicalities when the substantive rights have been
properly determined. To this end it is submitted that express legislative unification of the courts operating under Rule 330 is
desirable.
William T. Blackburn
REAL PROPERTY -

TENANCY By THE ENTIRETIES ONE SPOUSE

BY

MURDER OF

THE OTHER

Property was owned by a husband and wife as tenants by the
entireties. The husband murdered the wife and then committed
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suicide. The representative of the wife's estate brought an action
against the husband's estate for determination of title. Held:
Property owned by the entireties remains vested in the surviving
spouse regardless of the survivor's felonious method of terminating the tenancy. National City Bank of Evansville v. Bledsoe,
Ind. -, 133 N.E.2d 887 (1956) (4-2 decision).
Tenancy by the entireties is a common law estate, based upon
the fiction of unity of the husband and wife, in which each have
a vested interest in the whole estate subject to the interest of the
other. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §418 (3d ed. 1939). The
surviving tenant takes the entire estate by virtue of the original
grant and not as a survivor. Sharpe v. Baker, 51 Ind. App. 547,
96 N.E. 627 (1911); 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §1803
(Perm. ed. 1940). Thus when one spouse is murdered by the
other, some courts have refused to deprive the survivor of any
rights in the tenancy, reasoning that it would work an unconstitutional forfeiture of a vested interest. Beddingfield v. Estill &
Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907); Welsh v. James,
408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1951); Schuman v. Schick, 950 Ohio
App. 413, 95 N.E.2d 330 (1953). But other courts have ruled
that one should not be permitted to profit by his own crime and
that the wrongdoer should take nothing. Van Alstyne v. Tuffy,
103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
No uniform rule has been formulated in murder cases because
the courts have vacillated, in varying degrees, between application of the strict rules of survivorship and the equitable doctrine
that one should not profit by his own wrong. A number of compromises have been reached; e.g., giving a legal life estate to the
survivor and imposing on him a constructive trust for the benefit
of the heirs of the victim, Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137
S.E. 188 (1927); giving the heirs of the victim the net income
of one-half of the property for the victim's life expectancy, Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517 (1933); changing
a tenancy by the entireties into a constructive tenancy in common,
Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Barnett v.
Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930); awarding the
heirs of the victim full title to the property, Vesy v. Vesy, 237
Minn. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385 (1952). For other cases see 32 A.L.R.
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2d 1099 (1953). The problem has not arisen in Texas because
of its adherence to the Spanish property law which does not merge
the individuality of the husband and wife. Dickson v. Strickland,
114 Tex. 176, 265 S.W. 1012 (1924). See also TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. (1925), art. 2580, abolishing survivorship.
Statutes precluding acquisition of property through murder are
generally held inapplicable because the survivor takes nothing
new. Wenker v. Landon, 161 Or. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939). But
see Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1936). The courts
are, therefore, without statutory guidance, having only a choice
between an application of the strict rules of survivorship and
varieties of equitable relief for the victim's heirs. Some believe
that an exception to the rules of survivorship would be an invasion
of the legislative function and the sanctity of vested property
interests. Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838
(1935). Those favoring a departure from survivorship principles
insist that the murderer must not be allowed any benefit from his
own wrong. 3 BOGERT, T.'USTS AND TRUSTEES § 487 (1946). This
conclusion is sometimes reached by entertaining a presumption
that, in the natural course of events, the victim would have survived the wrongdoer. 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 493.2 (1946).
Despite the common law fiction that the survivor does not
acquire any new interest, the practical result is a genuine benefit
to the murderer because he no longer needs to share profits and
the possibility of divestiture is removed. Although the majority
in the principal case rightly holds that vested interests should
not be disrupted, neither should the murderer receive any additional rights in the property. Considering the equities of the case,
it is submitted that the fiction of complete ownership in the entirety of the property should give way when equitable principles
intervene. But the matter is really one to be settled by legislative
John H. McElhany
or constitutional provision.
TORTS -

NEGLIGENCE -

ASSUMPTION OF RISK

P was a fare paying passenger of D airline. While passing
through rough and turbulent weather, P asked D's stewardess for
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permission to go to the lavatory, which permission was given.
While in the lavatory the plane hit a downdraft, throwing P to
the floor, resulting in a broken ankle. D airline invoked assumption of risk as a defense. Held: A passenger on a modem commercial airline does not voluntarily assume a risk with respect
to the plane itself or its operation, for airlines are subject to the
usual rules regarding common carriers which require exercise
of the highest degree of care consistent with practical operation
of the plane. Urban v. Frontier Air Lines, 139 F. Supp. 288 (D.C.
Wyo. 1956).
Assumption of risk, or the maxim volenti non fit injuria, is a
defense to an action in negligence which arises when the plantiff
voluntarily consents to expose himself to known dangers created
by the negligence of the defendant. Walsh v. West Coast Coal
Mines, 31 Wash.2d 396, 197 P.2d 233 (1948). A number of
jurisdictions, Texas included, distinguish the terminology used,
so that "assumption of risk" is applied to employer-employee
relationships or where the parties are in privity of contract, and
volenti non fit injuria is utilized in other negligence situations.
The practical effect of the two is now identical and the same rules
apply. Levlon v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 117 S.W.2d 876
(Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error ref.; Watterlund v. Billings, 112 Vt.
256, 23 A.2d 540 (1942). Although the plaintiff may expressly
consent to assume the risk, more often the consent is found by
implication from the facts. Several factual elements must be
proved before consent will be implied: (1) voluntary entry into
a dangerous situation, (2) full knowledge of the danger and risk
involved, and (3) full appreciation of the consequences which
might result from the known danger. Triangle Motors of Dallas
v. Richmond, 152 Tex. 354, 258 S.W.2d 60 (1953); Kirby
Lumber Co. v. Murphy, 271 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
But in all cases an objective standard is applied and if a reasonably prudent person would have known of the danger, the plaintiff
will be charged with knowledge. PROSSER, TORTS, p. 310, sec. 55
(2d. ed. 1955).
The defense is not limited to any particular situation, but covers
the entire field of negligence. It is available to common carriers.
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Fred Harvey Corp. v. Mateas, 170 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1948);
Bull S.S. Line v. Fisher, 196 Md. 519, 77 A.2d 142 (1950);
Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Service, 231 N.C. 181, 56 S.E.2d 560
(1949). Commercial airlines found it particularly appealing in
the early days of air travel and it is still available. It is, however,
unavailable where the negligence is in operation or servicing of
the plane. For a collection of cases see 83 A.L.R. 372; 12 A.L.R.
2d 666. It is now well established that the passenger assumes no
risk that the plane may be negligently maintained or operated.
Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E. 212
(1932); Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc., 1931 U.S.
Av. Rep. 205 (D.C. E.D. Pa.); Bruce v. O'Neal F)lying Service,
supra. Passengers have the right to expect that the plane itself will
be safe and that it will be operated with the highest degree of
care. They assume only perils attendant to air travel; thus, passengers must assume risks of injury caused by adverse weather and
other unpredictable circumstances which commonly are foreseen
by reasonably prudent passengers before boarding the plane. 20
J. AIR L. & COM. 102, 107 (1953).
Although the principal case recognizes these general rules, it is
believed that the court erred in applying them to the facts of this
case. It was found that the only negligence involved was that of
the stewardess in giving the plantiff permission to go to the lavatory during very rough weather. This was a negligent act not in
respect to the operation and maintenance of the plane, but was
merely an act incidental to passenger comfort. No case has been
found which denies an airline this defense as a matter of law if
the negligence giving rise to the injury was not directly related
to the aircraft, its maintenance or operation. The plantiff voluntarily left her seat in the face of known and appreciated danger
of injury from a fall due to the violently pitching aircraft. All
necessary elements to imply plantiff's assumption of the risk are
present, and as the negligent act was independent of the safe
continuance of the flight, the rules denying the defense as against
negligent operation of the plane logically should not apply.
Morton L. Susman
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TRADE NAMES-

RECENT CASE NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS-

C.A.B.

AUTHORITY

North American was chartered as an irregular air carrier under
the name "Twentieth Century Airlines" in 1946. In 1951 it
abruptly began to operate under the name of "North American
Airlines." A year later, it requested the Civil Aeronautics Board
to re-issue its letter of registration under the new name. American
Airlines asked the Board to deny the request, stating that use of
the new name would be an infringement upon American's long
established trade name. The Board instituted hearings to determine whether North American's action constituted unfair competition and a violation of the Civil Aeronautics Act. Held: The air
transportation industry is a field in which Congress wishes to
protect the public interest, and a finding that substantial public
confusion is a result of the use of similar trade name is sufficient
evidence to justify the issuance of a cease and desist order, as
it is an unfair or deceptive practice in violation of § 411 of the
Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 1003 (1938), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 491 (1940). American Airlines v. North American Airlines, 351 U.S. 79 (1956).
The right to protection against infringement of a trade mark
has frequently been sustained by equity courts in the United
States. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen Wheeler Co., 240 U.S.
403 (1916). The law as to trade marks and trade names is similar, but a trade name is distinguishable, as it need not be affixed
to the goods and involves the individuality of the maker, not only
for protection in trade and to avoid confusion in business, but
also to secure the advantages of a good reputation. Amer. Steel
Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372 (1925). Equity courts
have frequently seen fit to protect a manufacturer's use of a
geographical trade name, but the test has most often been whether
such use had been sufficient to give the name a secondary significance, or association with a particular manufacturer or vendor.
Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665
(1901); Amer. Waltham Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co., 173 Mass.
85, 53 N.E. 141 (1899). In the latter case, long continued use
of the geographical name "Waltham" had caused it to acquire
such a secondary meaning and the defendant was enjoined from
placing the word "Waltham" on the faces of its watches. It is
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well established, therefore, that a manufacturer or vendor, even
though he has no proprietary interest in a geographical trade
name, may enjoin another's use of such trade name if the effect
of such use is to deceive the public and divert the original user's
business. Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 Fed. 821 (8th Cir.
1901).
The law relating to unfair competition in the form of trade
name infringement was broadened by the passage of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, wherein Section 5 prohibited "unfair
methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in commerce. 38 Stat 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1938). The Act provided that the Commission cannot
assume jurisdiction without determining that the public interest
is involved and that such interest is specific and substantial.
Federal Trade Com. v. Klesner, 288 U.S. 212 (1929). Further,
the Commission has wide discretion in determining what constitutes the public interest. Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Com.,
1.20 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 664 (1941).
It has been established that the use of a trade name similar to
a competitor's is unfair competition within the meaning of Section 5. Federal Trade Com. v. Algoma Lbr. Co., 291 U.S. 67
(1934). No damages to a competitor need be shown to establish
the public interest. Koch v. Federal Trade Corn., 206 F.2d 311
(6th Cir. 1953).
The principal case was the first instance of construction of
Section 411 and, as the wording was nearly identical to that of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Court construed the provisions in par rnateria, relying upon F.T.C. cases
for precedent. The holding that the C.A.B. has authority to issue
a cease and desist order only on a finding that the similarity of
names caused substantial public confusion is an extension of the
holdings of the F.T.C. cases decided by the Supreme Court, but
it is in line with the holding in Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade
Com., supra, where the lack of evidence of damages to the public
was deemed immaterial. It follows the equitable rule with the
exception that no intent to deceive the public is necessary to the
board's action as was essential at common law. Coats v. Merrick
Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562 (1892).
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461

It is submitted that although the holding in the principal case
is within the law as generally established by the Federal Trade
Commission cases, this result should cause Congress to re-direct
its attention to this field. The broad power given the Civil Aeronautics Board here should be delegated to another administrative
agency better equipped to handle such disputes or else it should
be more clearly defined. The logical course would he to remove any
such controversies from the C.A.B.'s jurisdiction and allow the
F.T.C. to handle all similar cases that might arise in the future.
The F.T.C., with its great experience in trade name disputes,
would be able to dispose of the cases with more efficiency than
the C.A.B., which has machinery that is better geared to solve
other problems. Corrective legislation making the F.T.C. the sole
arbiter of trade name disputes in which the public interest is
involved would be a reasonable course to follow.
Eugene L. Smith

